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Wellsprings of a 'World War': An early English attempt to conquer Canada 
during King William's war, 1688-97  




The military historiography of early modern colonial America currently offers two 
contrary interpretations. One emphasises the exceptional nature of American 
warfare as a product of a process of military acculturation between the colonists and 
the native Americans; the other denies this acculturation in favour of the successful 
importation of orthodox European forms of warfare. By assessing the military history 
of the early years of King William's War, 1688-97, including in particular an early 
attempt to conquer French Canada in 1690 by Sir William Phips, this article 
contributes to this historiographical debate. King William's War (known on the 
European continent as the Nine Years' War) has been little studied in this context 
and the article argues that not only was military acculturation less relevant in the 
later seventeenth century, but also that the colonists' deployment of amphibious 
actions against the French demonstrated an increasing recognition that, strategically 
and militarily, they were required to draw closer to London's war policy and to 
replicate European combat.  
     
Two months after William, Prince of Orange, and his wife Mary jointly accepted the 
English throne in Whitehall's Banqueting Hall on 13 February 1689, the new king 
notified all colonial governors of his intention to join other European powers in 
declaring war on France.1 Almost immediately, an Order in Council followed which 
fully embraced a series of recent recommendations from the Lords of Trade and 
Plantations on the prosecution of the war overseas.2 To a large extent, William was 
by these communications seeking to underline his authority throughout the overseas 
territories as elsewhere. This was particularly the case with the colonies on the 
American mainland which had suffered considerable administrative and political 
disorder since reports reached them of William's landing at Torbay in November 
1688 at the head of some 14,000 troops and the subsequent flight of King James VII 
& II to France.3 The events of the Revolution of 1688 had understandably provoked 
considerable anxiety and uncertain loyalties amongst the governors and colonial 
officials, who owed their appointments almost exclusively to James. To them, 
therefore, William was signalling the necessity of settling allegiances. 
Concern with bolstering his monarchical authority abroad is not the only 
interpretation that William's early announcements on the war overseas admits. The 
Earl of Halifax noted the war's priority for William such that 'it would incline one to 
think, he took England only in his way' as the principal Protestant champion against 
Louis XIV's Catholic and absolutist France.4  William may well have been 
immediately seeking to co-opt and embed England's overseas territories within his 
emerging wartime Grand Strategy. Over half a century ago, G. S. Graham embraced 
this interpretation by arguing that the Nine Years' War, 1688-97, or King William's 
War as it was known in the colonies, marked a watershed in the history of warfare on 
the grounds that it represented the first colonial attempt to 'wage world war' in 
conjunction with the imperial parent.5 Nevertheless, characterising the Nine Years' 
War as a 'world war' in which the North American colonialists were from the outset 
essential participants in the imperial parent's global war strategy was overblown. The 
recommendations of the Lords of Trade and Plantations for North America, which the 
king accepted with alacrity in the spring of 1689, were decidedly limited. The Lords 
had simply proposed that William should settle a number of new governors, who 
should then, in conjunction with the appropriate colonial institutions and officials, 
determine how to act against France.6 Unlike the European theatre in Flanders, 
where John Evelyn deemed 'the greate stress of the quarrel lies',7 there was for the 
North American plantations to be no commitment of military resource nor proposals 
for an increased naval presence. 
Graham's view did nonetheless provide a counterpoint to nineteenth-century 
American histories on the colonial wars such as Francis Parkman's Half-Century of 
Conflict. This work in particular contextualised the colonial conflict during King 
William's War as part of the historical evolution of the military in North America, and 
this local interpretation has endured. Modern works by Richard Johnson and Guy 
Chet readily demonstrate that the North American theatre during King William's War 
was neither united within the Grand Strategy nor even strategically categorised along 
with the more prosperous Caribbean islands as part of a single Atlantic empire.8  
Indeed, the history of the early years of war in North America emphasised 
continuities in the colonial conduct of warfare which were parochial; and even when 
the colonialists did attend to William's principal strategic objective - namely the 
wholesale reduction of French power wherever exercised - it was a product of their 
long-standing search for frontier security rather than an attempt to integrate the 
conduct of the Anglo-French conflict in the colonies with the war in Europe. 
Notwithstanding, as Johnson contends, the outbreak of the European war did frame 
North America as an Anglo-French 'battleground for Atlantic supremacy',9 and, 
despite the continuities in warfare, the early years of the war might be seen to 
foreshadow changing strategic and military thinking on the conduct of colonial 
warfare.10  
The military historiography of early modern New England embraces two 
perspectives. An established interpretation identifies the exceptional nature of 
American military strategy and tactics - which proved successful against the British 
Army during the Revolutionary War, 1775-83 - as the progeny of the colonial period. 
Specifically, A. J. Hirsch has argued that in the early-to-mid-seventeenth century 
warfare underwent a process of acculturation whereby the military habits of the 
Indians and English colonists first clashed and were then mediated; accordingly both 
sides were to have gained a clearer understanding of the other's combat culture and 
practices were altered.11 For the colonists, one consequence was the dilution of their 
symmetrical European tactics with the asymmetry of the Indians' reputed 'skulking 
way of war'.12 The contrary view denies this process of acculturation and instead 
contends that from the mid-seventeenth century the colonists reaffirmed and 
entrenched their commitment to European military culture, tactics and strategy.13 
Guy Chet has reasoned that success for the colonists during the wars of the 
eighteenth century was a product of an offensive military strategy underpinned by 
the safeguard of being able to remain successfully on the tactical defensive, with the 
necessary logistics and lines of communication intact. The argument follows 
therefore that Britain was not defeated during the Revolutionary War by an 
exceptional American way of war but rather because London's strategy and tactics 
failed to adhere to the basic tenets and standards of European warfare.14  
Consideration of the military history of the early years of the Nine Years' War in 
North America, including in particular the very first planned attempt to seize Canada 
- the bureaucratic and political centre of La France Septentrionale (New France) - 
intrudes into this debate on the evolution of the American military. Despite the 
continuities in the pattern of the conflict, military acculturation was seemingly less 
relevant in the later seventeenth century when the English and French colonists 
were increasingly engaged in direct combat. Certainly the colonists' lamentable 
operational failures during this period highlighted the inefficacy of the local and 
largely asymmetrical 'small wars' fought according to Indian tactics. Moreover, the 
deployment of amphibious operations by the colonists (particularly in the attempt to 
capture Canada) indicated a recognition of the benefits of a mobile strategic 
offensive which simultaneously embraced (if properly planned and resourced) the 
tactical defensive. Indeed, analysis of these early war years should demonstrate the 
changing strategic and military perceptions on the conduct of colonial warfare which 
became more closely aligned to, and sought succour from, the imperial parent's 
Grand Strategy. 
I 
In the period immediately prior to the outbreak of the Nine Years' War, the local 
military realities in North America weighed heavily with both France and England. 
Although the French settlers in Acadia maintained a quiescent existence with the 
Wabanaki, Mi'kmaq and Maliseet tribes, Versailles's control of Canada - where the 
principal communities were situated around Quebec, Montreal and Trois Rivie`res - 
was vigorously disputed by the Five Nation Iroquois Confederacy of the Seneca, 
Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga and Cayugas Indians; the Iroquois were indeed the 
principal menace to the French in the late seventeenth century. This particular 
conflict destroyed the career of one governor-general of New France, Joseph de la 
Barre, who was recalled by Louis XIV in 1684 for negotiating what the king 
considered a humiliating peace treaty with the Confederacy, while La Barre's 
successor, the Marquis de Denonville, saw his position critically undermined by 
intrigue at the French court and inconsistent policy towards the Indians. Despite 
being given more men and resources to cow the Iroquois and developing a military 
strategy to conquer their north-eastern base of New York by attacking overland 
through Albany from Canada while a six frigate fleet bombarded the coastline from 
Manhattan to Boston, Denonville was opposed by the minister of marine and scion of 
the influential Colbert family, Marquis de Seignelay, who forced the governor's plan 
to be shelved and persuaded Louis in the early months of 1688, as he began to 
contemplate war on the European continent, to instruct that peace be sought.15  
The English colonists also possessed a full history of conflict with the native Indians. 
King Philip's War, 1675-78, had been bloodily fought against the Wampanoag in 
southern New England and the Wabanaki in the north. While the colonists eventually 
suppressed the former, victory against the latter had not been forthcoming. Initially, 
the Wabanaki had been reluctant to involve themselves in the southern land sales 
conflict but, having been goaded into war by the colonists' export to the northern 
regions of their clumsily conceived and implemented disarmament policy, they 
rigorously upheld the strategic sovereignty of their territory by expelling the English 
from the area northeast of Falmouth. In return for recognising Indian sovereignty 
over certain lands in Maine, the offering of marks of respect and the payment of 
annual corn quotient, the 1678 Peace Treaty allowed for colonial resettlement. 
However, throughout the 1680s, tensions flared over the payment of the quotient and 
the terms of resettlement which in effect nullified the peace treaty and led to 
individual colonial settlements seeking bilateral agreements with local Wabanaki 
tribes. Even then, as the New Hampshire and Maine colonists who in 1685 had 
concluded a separate peace treaty with the Pennacock, Saco, Androscoggin and 
Kennebac Wabanaki quickly appreciated, differences could not be reconciled.16 
Morrison contends that the continuing friction was a product of the lack of an 
enforcement mechanism within the treaties and, more prosaically, the cultural 
variance between the two societies.17 In this context, even limited military 
acculturation simply ensued that either side was better placed to wreck havoc on the 
other's way of life rather than promote a broader cultural appreciation. Certainly, as 
the depredations upon English settlements by tribal groups were vigorously 
maintained up to the Revolution of 1688, it would seem that both strategically and 
militarily the challenge posed by the Wabanaki to the English was credible and could 
not be readily dismissed.18  
On the North American plains these local conflicts with the numerous Amerindian 
tribes acted as proxy for the wider Anglo-French disputes. Although the European 
powers had arranged a Treaty of Neutrality in 1686, which included a provision to 
respect the current territorial boundaries in North America, attacks by, and on, their 
respective Indian allies increased up to the official outbreak of war in 1689.19 
European events had outstripped the ratification of Denonville's Treaty with the 
Iroquois and their historical pro-English stance meant that they knew about William's 
intent to enter the war before the French governor and sought to take advantage. A 
raid against the French farmers in the Lachine in the early morning of 5 August 1689, 
killing and capturing over a hundred, signalled the Iroquois's continuation of their 
conflict with the French, though increasingly within the context of the Anglo-French 
conflict.20  Similarly, English settlers complained of continuing French attacks by 
proxy. Pemaquid, a northern outpost on the Maine coast weakened by the 
aftershocks of the Revolution of 1688 in Boston, was lost to the Wabanaki in August 
1689, while in the same month a series of raids destroyed 30 families in 
Piscataqua.21  
Upon receipt of their official declarations of war, the European colonists on both 
sides continued to conduct the conflict through their allies amongst the indigenous 
peoples; but increasingly this parochial aspect of the war came to represent direct 
settler engagement and therefore the process of military acculturation became less 
relevant for the colonists on both sides. This subtle change in the prosecution of the 
war was largely a product of the arrival in North America in the autumn of Comte de 
Frontenac as a replacement for the ailing Governor Denonville. A scion of the 
Perigord noblesse d' p e, Frontenac held a senior French military office as a 
marechal-de-camp and had previously served as governor-general of New France 
from 1672 to 1681.22 Returning now for a second term in charge, he intended to 
implement - albeit in a modified form - Denonville's previously drafted plan for the 
capture of New York and the suppression of Iroquois mischief. Frontenac's 
expeditionary force had however been delayed by strong Atlantic headwinds 
following its departure from La Rochelle in August and, when it arrived off Quebec in 
early October 1689, it was too late in the season to mount the attack. Although 
denied this opportunity to undertake a potentially decisive single thrust against New 
York, and thinking (in the event wrongly) that the Iroquois might respond to peace 
overtures, Frontenac appreciated that propitious prospects existed to make territorial 
gains along the northern frontier of the English territories, where the changes among 
office-holders and uncertainty attendant upon the 1688 Revolution had weakened 
security. In addition, the French Canadian settlers were also now making clear to the 
governor their enthusiasm for retaliatory strikes against their English counterparts.23  
In order to make full use of these circumstances, Frontenac devised a three-pronged 
raiding strategy against the English northern frontier. Two groups were to proceed 
south: one from Montreal was to strike at the Albany fur-trading centre, whilst the 
second was to move from the settlement at Trois Rivieres and conduct opportunist 
attacks east of the Merrimack River. The third group was allotted an operational area 
south of the Androscogin River with the settlements on the Maine coast as their 
objective. Although the first raiding group changed their target, this trident of attacks 
bore fruit. In a similarly disordered condition as Pemaquid had been, Schenectady in 
New York was effectively razed by the French colonists in conjunction with their 
Indian allies. Successful assaults at Salmon Falls situated on the tributary of the 
Piscataqua along the Maine coast and upon Forts Loyal and Casco soon followed. 
By such actions, the French were effectively attacking the line of defensive 
fortifications that Governor Sir Edmund Andros had built up in the late 1680s to 
guard the exposed frontiers of the then newly established Dominion and Territory of 
New England, which comprised the mutually incorporated colonies of Connecticut, 
Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Plymouth and 
Rhode Island, from the attacks by the native Indians.24  
As Frontenac's raids gathered pace, the leaders of the component colonies of the 
Dominion of New England, which aside from Maine and Plymouth had had their 
independent status restored following the Revolution, began to talk of a response 
with its foundation being security through unity. The Massachusetts governor, Simon 
Bradstreet, wrote to the temporary insurgent governor of New York, Jacob Leisler, of 
the need for 'an Uniting and combining as one to withstand and Oppose the common 
Enemy',25  which prompted Leisler to call for a conference to plan a campaign of 
action.26 These developments signalled the colonists' intent to decrease their 
reliance on the Five Nation and other Amerindians for the furtherance of the war and, 
instead, for themselves to assume greater responsibility for the operational planning 
and execution of attacks against the French. There is no sense at this stage, 
however, that the colonists were seeking a role within William's wider Grand Strategy 
for the Nine Years' War. Governor Bradstreet did suggest an attack on Canada, but 
his operational purpose was not to check Louis XIV's global power by reducing New 
France but rather to plug the porous frontier security.27 Equally, when in response to 
Bradstreet's leadership of opposition to the French raids, the Massachusetts Council 
accelerated a pre-existing plan to assault Port Royal, the principal French Acadian 
settlement, the key motivation was to diminish French privateering capability against 
the local trading ventures. French potential to prosecute a vigorous guerre de course 
within inshore waters had been clearly demonstrated as early as October 1688 when 
L'Ambuscade and Le Fourgon (then based at Port Royal) had captured an English 
brigantine and six ketches trading between Port Royal and Canseau; and the French 
privateers' continued, and menacing, presence in these waters provoked a grave 
concern among English merchants for the security of their trade routes.28 There was 
also, however, a more general desire to avenge the French backed raids on the 
settlements in 1690 and, in particular, to damage the activities of the Acadian trader 
Jean-Vincent d'Abbadie de Saint-Castin who had close links to the Wabanaki 
through his marriage to the local chief's daughter.29  
 
II 
In January 1690 a group of prominent Massachusetts merchants led by John Nelson 
had first tried to put together an expeditionary force to attack those harbours and 
settlements which provided shelter to the French privateers.30  Their principal target 
was Port Royal which, due to the scale of the succour it provided, had gained a 
reputation as the 'Dunkirk of America'.31  In return for the loan of the colony's two 
sloops and a portion of public funding, the merchants offered the General Court and 
Representatives of Massachusetts a share of the plunder and future trade resulting 
from a successful action against the French. Although the General Court initially 
proved reluctant to give this project the go-ahead, a start was made in taking up 
public subscriptions.32 Raising monies, however, proved slow during the first months 
of 1690; and with the impact of Frontenac's raids being felt along with the continued 
loss of trade and fellow colonists' call for action, the Massachusetts leaders put aside 
any lingering doubts about the operation and pushed preparations forward by 
committing public money and by determining that two men out of every six be 
pressed to raise of a force of 500. Although requests were sent to London for 
supplies, particularly of powder and shot, the continuing preparations and the 
operation's timescale suggest that Massachusetts did not expect a positive reply. 
Consequently, when the land troops were embarked aboard a frigate, two sloops 
and three ketches in April none of the vessels had been provided by the Royal Navy 
and the provision of war supplies had been entirely local.33  
The General Court's assumption of control of the operation's organisation discounted 
Nelson's previously prominent role and it meant that he was passed over for the 
command of the expedition, with the former provost-marshal general of the Dominion 
of New England, Sir William Phips, gaining the appointment. An inveterate 
adventurer, Phips had made his money and reputation from humble beginnings as a 
ship's carpenter's apprentice through successful treasure hunting in the Caribbean 
Sea, and a judicious marriage to a widow of a Boston merchant. Though coarse and 
often unscrupulous, he had a talent for self-promotion which caused him originally to 
offer his services to this expedition. A self-taught sailor who lacked military 
experience, Phips nonetheless possessed an attitude of mind attuned to the task. 
This quality did not, however, compensate for the absence of specialised military 
understanding and his appointment throws into sharp relief the rather amateurish 
and provincial nature of the colonists' first wholesale engagement in King William's 
War. This point was only partially undermined by the progress of the operation.34  
Ten days before setting sail on 28 April, Phips received signed instructions from the 
governor and Council of Massachusetts. These orders focused upon the destruction 
of Port Royal which was to be achieved either through the offer of terms to the 
garrison or, if these were refused, though reduction by assault. Further, and perhaps 
in deference to the mercantile interest reflected in the General Court's original order 
of 4 January, Phips was directed to continue along the Acadian coast to destroy 
other French possessions which might be used to harbour privateers.35 Overall, the 
instructions' favoured coastal strikes to undermine French prosecution of the guerre 
de course in local waters. There was also, however, an implicit recognition that any 
successful action by Phips would serve to weaken the French hold on Canada just 
as Bradstreet's original suggestion for attack on this French territory to stabilise 
frontier security was gaining an operational form following an inter-colonial 
conference meeting in late April.36  
On anchoring in Port Royal harbour 12 days after his departure from Nantasket, 
Phips waited a day before sending out a flag of truce on 10 May. The French 
commander, Governor Louis-Alexandre des Friches de Meneval, had already been 
apprised of the English approach by his forward guard. Supported by a garrison of 
less than 100 men to operate 18 cannon without emplacements, after a signal to the 
inhabitants had raised a paltry three volunteers out of at least 95 families totalling 
197 adults, Meneval took the understandable decision to seek the best terms 
possible. In this he was successful, for it had been Phips's intention that the garrison 
surrender at his discretion; and on 12 May he went ashore with some troops to 
plunder and despoil the local chapels.37  
After the operation Phips boasted that he had reduced the whole of Acadia in three 
weeks; in reality he encountered very little Acadian opposition.38 Ignoring the 
chronological framework of his instructions, Sir William undertook a number of 
amphibious coastal raids prior to approaching Port Royal. Just two days after his 
departure, he anchored at Mount Desert Island and despatched an officer to 
reconnoitre Penobscot Fort and, although the report made clear that only some 
native Indians remained, Phips determined to attack. On two occasions bad weather 
prevented the assault from going ahead and it was only on 4 May, when one of his 
ships engaged the fort prior to the land assault to reveal that all the inhabitants had 
fled, that the attack was cancelled. On the following day, once joined by the Salem 
and Ipswich companies, Phips again reordered his instructions' targeting priorities by 
an attack on the Passarequadie French plantation at the entrance to the Bay of 
Fundy. The six men wounded during this attack highlighted the ease with which men 
and resources could be wasted before coming upon the main target. Phips might 
well have argued that the loss of six men was a small price to pay, given the territory 
reduced, but the lack of opposition at Port Royal prevented a genuine test of the 
impact of these initial raids upon his force. 
'Piddling'39 is how D. E. Leach described the ultimate strategic worth of an operation 
which even failed to cover its cost through the plunder that Phips landed upon return 
to Boston on 30 May.40 Leach recognised, however, that this description was based 
upon inflated expectations which contemporaries - except perhaps Phips - never 
possessed. Aside from intimidating the Wabanaki, the expedition to Port Royal and 
the assaults on the Acadian coast were envisaged as a limited operation to reduce 
French privateering capability in local waters; a link to the grander strategic ambition 
in respect of North America (the reduction of Canada) had been implied but not 
formalised. Judged in the provincial context, both in respect of its composition and 
command and also its objectives, Phips's operation had proved modestly successful; 
but it was neither representative of a substantive strategic offensive nor did it 
possess the potential (due principally to a lack of resources) to adhere to the 
orthodox defensive tactics redolent of European warfare in general. 
It has already been noted that success in the raids against French Acadia had been 
implicitly linked to the more ambitious project - originally proposed by Bradstreet - to 
reduce Canada. During the progress of the Acadian operation, the inter-colonial 
conference comprising representatives from New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut 
and Plymouth had largely presumed upon its success and had formulated a plan 
which focused upon the capture of Quebec and Montreal. Historians have 
customarily referred to the plan as 'two-pronged',41 but caution is required for this 
implies a military as well as a strategic equivalence and thus conflates two quite 
different forms of warfare. One attack was to be a 150-mile thrust by troops through 
the North American interior from Albany to strike at Montreal. The second was to be 
a seaborne assault upon Quebec: the fleet carrying a body of troops would navigate 
from Boston by the western shores of Anticosti Island and then haul south-west up 
the St Lawrence River, seeking an appropriate landing point for the soldiers from 
which an attack could be launched. In outline, therefore, this second operation 
demanded an internal combination between land and sea forces. The only military 
link between the two attacks was their common ability to act as a diversion for each 
other. By submitting the two towns to simultaneous assaults, it was anticipated that 
the French forces would be fatally divided and thus permit the capture of at least one 
town upon which the two forces could link and secure Canada.42  
The point has subsequently been well made that this plan encapsulated the 
approach which became the standard pattern for successive English attempts to 
conquer Canada; but on this first occasion London played no part.43 It was not that 
the ministry was unaware of the colonists' intent to attack Canada, or that it failed to 
appreciate the strategic prize being offered by the capture of the territory.44 However, 
the troubled Irish theatre was currently demanding a disproportionate amount of the 
government's military and naval resource as William opposed the Jacobite attempt to 
claim the island as a staging post for James VII & II's return to his mainland 
kingdoms. In any event, any military capacity which might be released from a 
quiescent Ireland was to be dedicated to the war on the European continent; and 
William's commitment to this deployment of resources was evident from his decision 
to delay his appearance at the head of the allied army in Holland and instead to 
cross the Irish Sea to take charge of the campaign on the island from 1690 in the 
hope of effecting a speedy resolution.45 These circumstances meant that, despite the 
support of the Lords of Trade and Plantations, the colonists' procurement request for 
frigates, troops and various other war supplies were not addressed by the ministry; 
and, although there remained a faint hope within the colonies that some war supplies 
at least would arrive for the operation (which, ironically, they did, but not until the 
following year), the colonists ultimately had to accept that London was content for 
the war in the colonies to be broadened as a function of frontier defence.46 This local 
motivation for an attack on Canada was convenient for the ministry, not only on the 
grounds that it resonated with the allied Grand Strategy, but also because it provided 
the self-serving argument that the colonists should bear the operational burden 
wholesale. 
In the short term a meeting of the colonists on 1 May simultaneously signalled their 
acceptance of England's inertia and their own administrative and procurement 
responsibilities for the attempted conquest of Canada. The material demands of the 
overland attack were less because it was to be undertaken in conjunction with 
between 1,500 and 1,800 Five Nation Indians. The provinces represented at the 
conference therefore agreed that they would have to supply only a total of 885 men 
for the interior force with proportionate arms and ammunition.47 Complaints soon 
followed, however, that some provinces had failed to provide their quotas and it 
became clear that the total fixed upon would remain a paper figure. There was also 
much wrangling over the appointment of a commander for the overland attack. 
Relations between the colonies became strained because New York believed that it 
had been forced to accept Boston's and Connecticut's candidate, Major-General 
Fitzjohn Winthrop, and the rancour could only have had a negative impact upon the 
cohesion of the force.48 Meanwhile, Massachusetts principally laboured with the 
logistical and bureaucratic problems inherent in trying to fit out the operation directed 
against Quebec. Although it has been suggested that New York sent two ships as a 
contribution, they did not subsequently take part in the expedition; and thus the fleet 
of 32 ships with up to four months provisions aboard that eventually proceeded up 
the St Lawrence was provided for by private subscription. As for the troops, the 
Massachusetts House of Deputies enacted legislation to encourage volunteers by 
the offer of pay plus the division of a half of all plunder.49 This financial inducement, 
in conjunction with the more physical means of impressment, produced a force of up 
to 2,500 men50  whose commander was Lieutenant-General John Walley. He was to 
answer to Sir William Phips, who had on his return from Port Royal been appointed 
the operational commander-in-chief. 
Fitzjohn Winthrop began his overland march to Montreal on 1 August with a force of 
only 500 militiamen and a prevailing confusion as to how many, if any, native Indians 
were to join him. Only around 70 Iroquois did, less than four per cent of the 
maximum number expected, with the rest decimated by the smallpox that had also 
affected Winthrop's force. Moreover, it soon became apparent that his problems 
would not just be confined to personnel. On reaching Wood Creek it was found that 
there were too few canoes for the troops to proceed on the next stage of the journey 
north across Lake Champlain, and it was too late in the year for birch bark to prove 
effective building material. As these delays were encountered, supplies also began 
to diminish. Albany had from the outset been opposed to Leisler's governorship, and 
New York believed Winthrop to have been imposed upon them, thus the political 
circumstances were not propitious for a resolution of these logistical and manpower 
problems. A week passed as the force was held up at Wood Creek and on 15 
August a council of war decided that the original plan was no longer viable. Using 
such canoes as were available, Winthrop despatched a force under John Schuyler 
on a series of opportunistic raids around Montreal, while the main force retreated to 
Albany. It arrived on 20 August to a political storm and a personal confrontation 
between Winthrop and Leisler over the failure of the expedition which resulted in the 
former's temporary imprisonment.51 Meanwhile, Schuyler proved himself not more 
than a nuisance to the French by raiding La Prairie near Montreal. This act, far from 
proving diversionary, doubtless only advertised the colonists' weakness to the 
French and allowed Governor Frontenac to switch men and resources to the 
previously poorly supplied Quebec as Phips made his approach.52  
According to an observer at Montreal, it was Frontenac's ability to reinforce Quebec 
which proved the determinate factor in the failure of the English operation. Lahontan 
thought that if the descent had been made within two days before or after 
Frontenac's arrival in the walled town, then Phips and Walley would have been 
successful. With this, Phips's chaplain, Reverend John Wise, wholeheartedly 
agreed.53 The debilitating loss of time can be explained by a concatenation of 
circumstances. First, waiting forlornly for supplies from England, Phips's fleet did not 
leave Boston till 9 August and then the three divisions - the admiral's squadron 
commanded by Captain Gregory Sugars in the Six Friends, the vice-admiral's 
squadron commanded by Captain Thomas Gilbert in the Swan, and the rear-
admiral's squadron commanded by Captain Joseph Eldridge in the American 
Merchant - made a leisurely pace, capturing some French privateers en route, to 
reach the mouth of the St Lawrence by mid-September. More time was lost as the 
fleet proceeded up the river in bad weather without the necessary pilots. 
Consequently, it was 5 October before the fleet hauled to as it reached the Ile 
d'Orleans, coming to anchor on an ebb tide in the roadstead between that island, the 
south and north shore of the St Lawrence and Quebec town.54  
Convention dictated that a summons should be sent first to the governor of the 
targeted town. On 6 October this was conveyed ashore by Captain-Lieutenant 
Savage, and in reply Frontenac rejected the offer in what Phips considered a 
'revilling answer'.55 Accordingly, the council of war (composed of the ships' captains 
and the senior soldiers and chaired by Phips) resolved to land the soldiers on a 
beach - the Beauport Shore - approximately two miles below Quebec town. The 
soldiers were then to advance towards Quebec with the aim of making camp on the 
bank of the St Charles River which lay between them and the town. The intention 
was that before this river be crossed, Phips would send up the St Charles a number 
of small vessels containing the necessary ordnance, ammunition and victuals. This 
allowed the troops to be largely unburdened at their landing, carrying only two 
biscuits and a minimal amount of ammunition. The plan's d nouement directed that 
four vessels from Phips's fleet bombard the town to soften up its defences prior to 
the land assault and, as a diversionary tactic, a number of other vessels were to 
proceed beyond the town in the hope of convincing the enemy that a second army 
was to be landed. If the main force was successful in making the river crossing, and 
Phips spied them on the hill to the east above Quebec where they were to launch 
their attack, then he would land a smaller body of 200 men under the cover of the 
fleet's guns in an attempt to breach the town's walls.56  
Such operational plans, particularly when they involve the co-ordination of land and 
sea forces, are typically reliant upon internal sequencing. In this instance, however, 
the plan was overly dependent upon the seamless transition of each stage. Once 
ashore the land force's tactical mobility, and also defence, was entirely dependent 
upon the navy establishing an interior line of communication. If boats with the 
necessary war stores and provisions were not dispatched to the St Charles, then the 
soldiers would be able neither to make the river crossing nor to advance. Equally, 
even if the interior line was established, then the naval bombardment and the thrust 
down the hill would have to be precisely timed to ensure that each had its maximum 
effect; notably there was little latitude with which to absorb any chronological 
slippage. As the New Englanders contemplated their position off the north shore of 
the St Lawrence River at the beginning of October, facing a resolute defensive force 
entrenched in a fortified town that was naturally sited upon a cliff, such planning 
prescriptions might, with some justification, have been considered foolhardy. 
Certainly the circumstances which unfolded on the first day of the operation were not 
propitious for its success. 
A landing was first attempted on 7 October only for it to fail as the ships' boats and 
the other small vessels in which the soldiers were embarked were tossed back from 
the shore by the heavy surf brought on by the bad weather. Embarrassingly, the only 
boat that made progress - a captured French barque containing Captain Ephraim in 
command of 60 troops - ran aground on the north shore on a half-ebb; and, as the 
tide fell further, it could not float off. With the vessel's vulnerability clear to the 
French, Phips had to bring some naval ordnance to bear in order to safeguard the 
barque while a flood tide was awaited.57 Dawn on 8 October heralded better weather 
and a successful landing was completed, though with the flats lying some distance 
off, the men were forced to wade through water that was between knee and waist 
deep. Various estimates put the number of effective men landed as between 1,200 
to 1,40058 - a considerable reduction from the number embarked due to an outbreak 
of smallpox during the outward voyage - and Lieutenant-General Walley immediately 
ordered four companies to be drawn out from this number as 'forlons' for the 
advance towards the uplands. These formations fulfilled their purpose as they drew 
the attention of a sharp fire from the enemy who had upwards of 800 men variously 
posted on either wing, behind bushes to the left and amongst a small village beyond 
a creek on the right. A general charge forced a short French retreat, though they 
almost immediately gained security from the swamp and shrub. This provided them 
with the necessary cover from which to snipe effectively at the New Englanders as 
they continued, exhausted from the wade ashore and the intensity of the immediate 
firefight, to make heavy going of the march to the St Charles. By nightfall, with the 
two biscuits long since consumed and ammunition low, though only suffering 
casualties of less than ten killed and 60 wounded, they came to within half a mile of 
the river and made camp in the expectation that by daylight Phips would have 
delivered the essential logistical support.59  
It was at this stage in the operation that the plan's sequencing began to mistime. By 
midnight only six eight-pound field guns had been delivered and were almost 
immediately rendered useless by being landed on marshy ground. A request for 
victuals and ammunition yielded, by daylight on 9 October, only half a barrel of 
powder. Then, in a move contrary to the plan's order, Phips brought four vessels 
about to bombard the town before the soldiers had captured the hilltop or even 
crossed the St Charles. Both the anonymous pamphleteers and Mather commended 
Phips's action as brave and necessary. Both emphasised that, despite his own 
vessel sustaining much damage from the town's 24-pounders over the course of an 
engagement lasting several hours, only three men were lost, and that in bringing the 
ships down alongside the town, he had a legitimate expectation that the soldiers 
would be advancing from the east. In this respect, Wise was particularly censorious 
of Walley's leadership, arguing that he was consumed by an 'Invincible Arrest of 
fear',60 and that his command from the landing had suffered many errors of 
judgement, not the least of which was to hold up the advance. Understandably, the 
majority of the soldiers on land held no such views. They believed that Phips had 
transgressed the council of war's resolutions in the full knowledge that he provided 
neither for the army's tactical mobility nor its ability to sit on the defensive. 
Furthermore, the bombardment had expended vast quantities of powder and shot 
without benefit to the army. Indeed, these circumstances, combined with Phips's and 
the other naval captains' seeming indifference to the troops' cold and hunger, meant 
that the soldiers felt increasingly alienated from the operation's purpose.61  
Prior to the bombardment, Lieutenant-General Walley had received detailed 
intelligence from some French prisoners which had made the likelihood of the 
operation's success seem increasingly dim. It was reported that since the arrival of 
Frontenac from Montreal, Quebec had been reinforced at least twice and that there 
were approximately 3,000 soldiers in the town, a figure which did not include the 
several hundred situated on the other side of the St Charles who had opposed 
Walley's landing. Walley judged that the lack of provision was beginning to tell upon 
the men and that, although he sent out reconnaissance parties with orders to hunt 
and gather whatever was available, the French had hastily removed all beasts from 
the immediate area. With no sign of the small vessels from the fleet bearing 
provisions, he called a council of war of land officers on 9 October to review the 
situation. The lack of provisions and war materials and the fact that the troops faced 
a force three times their number weighed heavily with the council. These 
circumstances were compounded by the prevalent distemper which, with only one 
surgeon on hand, was daily decreasing the ranks. The land council therefore 
decided that Walley should inform Phips of the situation and suggest that the troops 
embark for a period of rest and refreshment.62 The accounts written from Phips's 
perspective claim instead that he took the decision to re-embark the troops on his 
return from the bombardment after realising that their current position was not the 
most suitable from which to assault the town.63 Regardless as to which view had 
prevailed, the decision advertised that the second attempt against Quebec had failed 
and the commanders had to organise the tricky process of bringing the troops off the 
shore. 
Walley had to arrange this embarkation in the knowledge that its successful 
execution would require a secure rear-guard movement. Upon reaching the beach 
on 10 October, however, he was informed of various skirmishes which had produced 
casualties and collapsed the morale amongst officers and men. Walley was forced to 
show resolve at the embarkation point by sending the first of the boats away when 
the security of his rear-guard was threatened by hundreds of troops moving in a 
disorderly manner on to the beach in order to board them. Nonetheless, having 
determined that he would embark the troops on 11 October, Walley intelligently 
sought to reinforce the guard by detaching three columns to drive back the enemy 
and ordering his officers to draw off half a regiment each till all the men were aboard 
their ships. The embarkation was completed the following day though not without (as 
Walley himself admitted) some disorder, which doubtless contributed to five field 
guns being abandoned.64  
Prior to undertaking a second landing of the troops (and a third attempt against 
Quebec), the council of war met on 13 October to review the force's capacity. This 
meeting also offered an opportunity to reconsider the landing disposition, thereby 
addressing Wise's criticism that the original beachhead had been too far removed 
from Quebec; it might also have discussed Phips's alternative plan to reduce the 
town to starvation by taking possession of the Ile d'Orleans, but inexplicably the 
council was adjourned without resolution. The council's resumption was intended on 
the following day after a full survey of all victuals and war supplies but bad weather 
then interposed to prevent its meeting. A storm blew up which drove the ships from 
their anchors and scattered the fleet beyond the Ile d'Orleans. Operations against 
Quebec had been terminated.65 Well might Mather ascribe the failure to the 'Hand of 
Heaven'.66  
The majority of the fleet returned to Boston on 19 November, though the journey 
home was not without incident. Aside from four missing vessels, up to three were 
wrecked en route and the forces who made port were decimated by smallpox: one 
estimate put the first ship home as having lost over 50 per cent of her men to the 
disease.67 The soldiers' circumstances, in particular, only worsened when they 
reached harbour. The colonial leaders had again presumed upon success and 
plunder to fund the expedition and thus there was no hard cash with which to pay the 
soldiers' wages. As a result, credit, in the form of paper bills, was introduced into the 
empire for the first time; and, although this provided the soldiers with some means of 
subsistence, it was discounted by the pernicious effects of variable exchange rates 
of as low as 12 to 14 shillings to the pound.68  
III 
Various reasons have been suggested for the colonists' retreat from Quebec in 1690. 
Chief among them is Winthrop's failure to attack Montreal and thus co-ordinate the 
necessary diversion for Phips's force on its approach to Quebec. Critically, 
Montreal's security allowed Governor Frontenac to augment and entrench Quebec's 
physical and human defences in anticipation of the English landings. As a result, 
some scholars have emphasised the French governor's command, arguing that 
throughout the week when Phips sought to engage the town with his land and sea 
forces, Frontenac organised a judicious defence which preserved Quebec without 
suffering heavy losses.69 Such tactical caution has also attracted its critics. They 
maintain that Frontenac passed up a propitious early opportunity, when Walley's 
troops were foundering on the Beauport Shore, to attack and devastate the English 
expeditionary force.70 Undoubtedly a notable victory might have been achieved by 
such an action but Frontenac rightly identified the risk he would have to bear as 
prohibitive. No military benefit could have accrued from having the burden of his 
men, rather than the enemy, disordered by crossing the St Charles River to reach 
the shore line. Moreover, by virtue of the mobility offered by Phips's naval force, the 
New Englander held the operation's tactical (not strategic, as Eccles contends) trump 
card. Frontenac could not be sure that the Beauport landings represented the 
principal land assault and he risked Phips undertaking another substantive landing 
further up the St Lawrence while the majority of the French troops were cut off on the 
Beauport Shore by the St Charles's tidal pattern.71 In this respect, Frontenac's 
preservation of his superior defensive force inside Quebec allowed him to dictate the 
progress of the operation by forcing Phips's men to make the difficult approach to the 
town. With a foretaste of the resolute and potentially bloody defence of the town 
which the French would mount being offered to Walley's troops as they began their 
march to the St Charles, Frontenac's tactics were rewarded by the English decision 
to give up the operation on the basis that they had neither the capability nor the 
resources to succeed. 
Although the two reasons for Phips's failure to reduce Canada - the absence of the 
Montreal diversion and Frontenac's assured organisation of Quebec's defence - can 
readily be found within the history of the operation, there is a third more general and 
systematic explanation which is far less persuasive. This interpretation focuses upon 
the form of warfare adopted for the attack, namely a combined land and sea 
operation, with the critics claiming that in the late seventeenth century this type of 
warfare was usually rendered ineffective due to disagreements between the land and 
sea commands, which were made worse by the vagaries of communication between 
the two. It is also contended that ultimately amphibious attacks could succeed only if 
the enemy's coastal defences were weak or if the attacking force possessed a 
secure and functioning supply line. Such operations have as a result been dismissed 
as possessing little military or diplomatic currency.72  
The blame attached to the operational form in this instance does, however, represent 
a sweeping and rather hurried appreciation of the combined operations undertaken 
by England during the Nine Years' War; these arguably proved far more successful 
than the critics of Phips's operation allow. Army-navy actions at Londonderry in 1689 
and again at Cork and Kinsale in 1690 provided important footholds to allow William 
to secure both the north and south of Ireland, thereby squeezing out the Jacobite 
challenge from its central position defending the line of the Shannon. Within 
continental Europe, combined operations against northern French ports and towns 
on the eastern Spanish coast (principally at Palam s) led to the English fleet 
wintering in the Mediterranean for the first time in 1694-95 and, more generally, 
contributed to the successful implementation of William's maritime strategy to 
establish England as a preponderant Mediterranean power. There was also some 
success, albeit limited, for combined arms in the Caribbean: Commodore Lawrence 
Wright's expeditionary force reclaimed St Kitts and the Dutch island of St Eustatius in 
1690 while temporarily holding Mariegalante in the following year; and in 1695 
Commodore Wilmot and Lieutenant-General Lillingston, despite a fractious 
relationship, expelled the French from northern Hispaniola. It is also notable that in 
1697 Captain John Norris and Colonel John Gibson organised their combined forces 
to defend St John's, Newfoundland, from further French encroachment.73 Of course 
these successes cannot hide the fact that the majority of the nine combined 
operations undertaken throughout the war failed; they do, however, sufficiently 
undermine the claim that the operational form of this type of warfare was 
fundamentally flawed and ill-conceived by London. 
During the Nine Years' War, therefore, amphibious warfare was increasingly 
deployed as a handmaiden to both the maritime and continental strategies variously 
pursued by William and his ministries. Overall, as the above examples evince, its 
mobile adaptability combined with the tactical defensive base offered by a integral 
and coherent operational deployment lent itself to its use as a diversionary tactic 
against the coastline of continental Europe, temporarily drawing enemy troops from 
the main theatre of operations and thereby raising the spectre of a second front, 
albeit one modest in size; while overseas, a combined army-naval force might 
provide the strategic platform for the capture of enemy territory, particularly islands. 
In North America, it was not therefore the generic form of warfare which was at fault 
but rather that Sir William Phips's combined operation was forged by the colonists 
out of a local pattern of warfare based upon frontier defence which obscurely 
reflected, but was not integrated within, London's Grand Strategy. Consequently, and 
with further grievous implications for the operation, the colonists received no material 
help from England and they had to bear wholesale the provisioning of the men and 
equipment. In addition to the tactical failures during the course of the operation, such 
as the absence of a diversion at Montreal and the mistiming of the plan's internal 
sequencing, and Frontenac's shrewdly stolid defence, it was clear that the 
operational capability should be viewed as limited and poorly comprised from the 
outset. 
The point was further underscored by the events immediately following the return of 
Phips's depleted squadron to Boston. With the colonies, and Massachusetts in 
particular, struggling with the financial consequences of the operation which they had 
had to fund and which had failed to pay for itself, Sir William quickly left for London in 
order to lobby for another operation against Canada. His swift departure and 
subsequent representations indicated that the colonists now fully realised that 
Canada could not be conquered by an amphibious action comprised as a function of 
frontier defence; instead, England would have to provide a substantial and sustained 
commitment. Phips's proposal of June 1691 called for such a material contribution 
from England: a third-rate vessel and a preponderant artillery capability, including 
100 cannon with a ten-fold proportion of powder barrels, was considered a 
minimum.74 London's silence in response to this scheme caused Phips rashly to 
dilute his requirements in a second proposal he set before the Lords of Trade in the 
autumn: the number of cannon required was now unexpressed, while the mortar 
procurement was cut by half and the proportion of powder was reduced by some 800 
barrels.75 Even with these reductions neither the king nor the Lords of Trade and 
Plantations were prepared to afford Phips a second opportunity - albeit this time with 
some material contribution from England - to attempt the reduction of New France. 
Indeed, the only subsequent attempt against Canada during the war which London 
did promote was as the latter half of a West Indian expedition in 1693. However, the 
maladministration in the planning of the expedition, combined with the ravages of the 
sickness throughout the expeditionary force when in the Caribbean, meant that no 
credible assault against Quebec could have been or was attempted.76  
Labouring under straitened financial circumstances, and without more substantial 
material and strategic commitment from England, for the remaining period of 
hostilities between England and France the North American colonists could only 
promote a parochial defensive war of frontier skirmish which was both reliant upon, 
and to a lesser degree directed against, the Indians. This represented a continuation 
of the local pattern of warfare which had been established prior to the outbreak of 
war and which continued, though with a subtle shift to emphasise the responsibility 
and participation of the colonists on either side, following the official declarations of 
war in 1689. The 1690 attack on Quebec had emerged from this pattern and offered 
an insight to the importance of capturing Canada from France, along with an 
operational blueprint which might in future be adopted by London and a recognition 
that the colonists could not successfully undertake the operation as a function of 
their internal security. In this respect the process of military acculturation between 
native and colonist was less relevant, as the latter demonstrated a preference for an 
amphibious form of warfare which through increased deployment was attaining 
orthodox status in England. The operations of 1690 prompted the colonists' dawning 
realisation that strategic military success in colonial warfare might be obtained only 
by integration within London's Grand Strategy; above all else this assimilation might 
allow them to avail themselves fully of the resources required for the adopted 
methods of European warfare. The early conduct of King William's War in the North 
American territories had foreshadowed the necessity for the colonists' limited 
national military experience to give way to participation in a world war. 
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